Using data drawn from a survey conducted shortly after the 2002 elections, we investigate the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) election victory from the perspective of inter-party vote movements. Our aim is not only to identify the parties from which the AKP votes originated, but also the segments of these parties' voter bases the party appealed to in particular. Descriptive statistics suggest that almost all of the voters who had voted for the pro-Islamist party in 1999, about half of those who supported the center-right and the ultra-nationalist parties, and one-fifth to two fifth of the supporters of the center-left parties were captured by the AKP. Given that the actual vote share of the party was 34.3 percent, we interpret these figures as evidence of further voter realignment after the election. Our econometric work reveals that confidence in the economic performance of the party was a leading factor in the election outcome. For the voters attracted from the left-of-center parties, ideological factors also played an important role, whereas in the case of voters transferred from the far-right pro-Islamist and ultra-nationalist parties, it was the demographic factors. For the voters coming from the center-right, both sets of variables were important.
Introduction
In the November 3, 2002 Turkish parliamentary election, more than half of the voters cast their ballots for a party different than the one they chose in the previous election held on April 18, 1999 . None of the parties which entered the parliament in 1999 were able to do so in 2002, failing to surpass the ten percent national threshold required to be represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The aggregate vote share of the three incumbent parties, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP), dropped to 14.7 percent from 53.4 percent. In addition to the voters which deserted the incumbent parties, 2.5 percent of the voters left the True Path Party (DYP), one of the opposition parties. Furthermore, the dissolution of the main opposition Virtue Party (FP) by the Turkish Constitutional Court on June 22, 2001 for engaging in anti-secular activities, forced 15.4 percent of the electorate which voted for this party in 1999, to make another choice in 2002.
The voters who migrated from the political parties mentioned above moved essentially to one of the following three parties: the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Young Party (GP), with the former receiving the lion's share. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), one of the two parties which emerged from the banned Virtue Party (FP), on 14 August 2001, only 15 months before the election, received 34.3 percent of the votes and captured almost twothirds of the parliamentary seats. Its proportion of the vote was more than twice that of the Virtue party (FP) in 1999, indicating that it attracted votes from other parties as well. The party raised its vote share to 46.6 percent in 2007 and continues to rule in a singleparty government. The Felicity Party (SP), the other party with roots in the Virtue Party (FP) however, received only 2.5 percent of the vote in 2002 and 2.3 percent in 2007, perhaps due to towing the anti-Western, anti-EU and pro-Islamist line of the old Virtue Party (FP), unlike its rival Justice and Development Party (AKP), which disavowed it. 1 Although it is obvious that the voters lost by the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), the Virtue Party (FP) and the True Path Party (DYP), essentially ended up in the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Young Party (GP), it is not clear how these voters were distributed among the latter three parties, and which socioeconomic and ideological segments of these voters were captured by each of the latter parties. There are very few quantitative studies on this area and most of these rely on simple statistical methods. For example, Nuhrat (2002) , Erdem (2002a and and Turan (2004) utilize only descriptive statistics in their analysis of pre-election surveys, whereas Esmer (2002a and conduct similar analyses using post-election surveys. Tosun (2003) and Tüzün (2007) compare the outcomes of the 1999 and 2002 elections at the province and district levels, respectively, basing their conclusions regarding interparty vote shifts on simple correlations between the 1999 vote shares of losing parties with the 2002 vote shares of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Republican People's Party (CHP). The only study to use a rigorous statistical procedure to estimate vote movements between various parties is Akarca (2008) . His method involves the estimation of the vote movement between any two parties, controlling for all other inter-party vote shifts. He also includes several socio-economic variables in his model, but with province level election data, he is unable to examine the potential impact of the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals.
In the present study, we intend to determine the sources of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) votes in 2002 using micro data which will enable us to consider voter characteristics in detail. For this purpose, we will utilize data drawn from a survey conducted shortly after the 2002 election, in which participants were questioned about their votes in both 1999 and 2002. The data in question also contains information about the socio-demographic characteristics of the participants and their ideological and religious tendencies. Our aim is to identify not only the parties from which the Justice and Development Party (AKP) votes have originated, but also the segments of these parties' voter bases the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was able to attract in particular. In the next section, we present descriptive statistics pertaining to our data and discuss the insights they provide. In Section 3, we present the results of the logit regressions which express a voter's tendency to vote for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 as a function of his/her party preference in 1999, socio-demographic and ideological characteristics, and confidence in regards to the future of the economy. This method allows us to measure vote shifts to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from each of the other parties together in a single equation, rather than one-at-atime as is the case with most of the previous studies. Finally, to determine which segments of the voter bases of other parties Justice and Development Party (AKP) has attracted, we estimate a more comprehensive model in which the interactions between the voter's 1999 party choice and his/her other characteristics are included as explanatory variables. To the best of our knowledge, the latter issue has not been examined empirically in any study.
Determining the origins and characteristics of the voters who have migrated to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) will enable us to bring out the coalition upon which the party is based. This in turn should help analysts gauge the stability of the party (and thus the government), and understand the rationale behind the positions it takes. It should be noted, however, that tying the inter-party vote transfers to specific events or historical trends and developments, although very important, is beyond the scope of the present study. Some of the studies which address these are Çarkoğlu (2002) , Çağaptay (2002) , Açıkel (2003) , Özel (2003) , Öniş and Keyman (2003) , Bacik (2004) , Atacan (2005) , Tepe (2005) , Öniş (2006) , Akarca and Tansel (2006) , Özbudun (2006a and 2006b) , Kalaycıoğlu (2007) , Sayarı (2007) , Taşpınar (2007) , and Yıldırım, İnaç and Özler (2007) .
2.
The data and descriptive statistics
The survey which generated our data was conducted during the December 21-27, 2002 period by Social Research Center (SAM), a private research and consulting firm, under the direction of Cenap Nuhrat. It employed a multi-stage stratified random sampling method to create a sample representative of the Turkish electorate. The 1207 individuals in the resulting sample came from 25 of the 81 provinces in Turkey. These were scattered throughout the country and include the following provinces: Antalya, İçel, Maraş, Isparta, Kars, Malatya, Elazığ, İzmir, Afyon, Kütahya, Manisa, Gaziantep, Batman, Siirt, Ankara, Eskişehir, Konya, Amasya, Giresun, Zonguldak, Çorum, İstanbul, Kocaeli, Bursa, and Edirne. While 24 percent of the respondents were residents of the metropolitan areas of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, 40 percent of them came from other urban areas and the remaining 36 percent from rural regions. In estimating our regressions however, we were able to use only 1080 of the observations. First of all, we eliminated from the sample, all 59 observations from Siirt and Batman provinces in the southeastern region. The behavior of voters in this region is considerably different than in the rest of the country and is largely ethnically driven. 2 We also had to exclude observations for which some of the explanatory variables were missing and those involving respondents who were too young to vote at the time of the 2002 election. This resulted in the elimination of 68 other observations spread among the other provinces in the sample. The 152 individuals who reported not voting in 2002 and 45 who declined to reveal their vote were not excluded from the sample. Some of these individuals may be supporters of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). However, their support apparently is not strong enough to induce them to cast their ballot or own it afterwards. So we treated them as a separate category similar to the way we treated the voters who voted for other parties. The definitions and sample means of the explanatory variables to be utilized in the econometric work are given in Table 2 , for the entire sample and for the subsamples of those who did and did not vote for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. The subsample means imply that, compared to the supporters of other parties, the supporters of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) are older, more religious, further to the right in the ideological spectrum, and more optimistic about the future of the economy. The party is also more popular among females and those with less schooling. The subsample means reveal also that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) supporters are poorer than the supporters of other parties. However we have not included Income as an explanatory variable in our analysis because it turned out to be highly correlated with the years of education and failed to contribute significantly to regressions which included the schooling variable.
The mean values of the party dummies imply that the former Democratic Left Party (DSP) voters constituted 13 percent of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) voters in 2002, the former Nationalist Action Party (MHP) voters 18 percent, the former Motherland Party (ANAP) voters 14 percent, the former True Path Party (DYP) voters 12 percent, the former Virtue Party (FP) voters 21 percent, and the former Republican People's Party (CHP) voters 4 percent. Two percent of the party's voters came from those who voted for other parties in 1999, 7 percent from those who were eligible but chose not to vote in 1999, and 4 percent from those who were too young to vote in 1999. If we consider only those who have actually voted in 1999 and revealed their party choice, these figures imply that about one-fourth of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) supporters came from the pro-Islamist party, one-fifth from the ultra-nationalist party, one-third from the two center-right parties, and one-fifth from one of the two center-left parties.
The proportion of the individuals in the sample who claim to have voted for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is higher than the 34.3 percent the party actually received in the 2002 election. It appears that further political realignment has occurred after the election. Some individuals who are sympathetic to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) but voted for its close substitutes seem to have switched sides after witnessing its success, preferring to associate themselves with the victor. The failure of the parties they voted for to even enter the parliament must have also played a role in causing them to reassess their allegiances. A survey conducted about a month before the election by the same organization whose data we are using (SAM under the direction of Cenap Nurhat, 2002) gives the proportion of voters expressing a support for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as 33.9 percent which is very close to the actual election outcome. A more detailed comparison of our descriptive statistics with those of that survey and another one conducted only a week before the 3 November 2002 election by A&G Research Company, under the direction of Taha Erdem (2002a and , is given in Table 3 3 Also, the party's 22 July 2007 parliamentary election vote was 46.6 percent. In short, our findings should be interpreted as reflecting the situation about two months after the 2002 election, incorporating the further realignment, rather than at the date of the election.
Some of the surveys mentioned above investigated also the socio-demographic characteristics of the 2002 voters. While Erdem (2002b) found the supporters of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to be predominantly male, relatively older and less educated, as is the case in our sample, Esmer (2002a and found them to be relatively less educated, but younger and with no gender bias. On the other hand, a survey conducted during October 2002 by Yönelim Company, results of which are summarized in Turan (2004) , found the Justice and Development Party (AKP) supporters to be predominantly male, relatively younger and with less schooling. 4 Thus, there appears to be a consensus among various surveys that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) supporters are relatively less educated, but no such agreement as to their age group or gender.
Comparing what our data suggests with those of macro studies is also in order. Akarca (2008) , who investigates vote movements at the province level, through regression analysis, concludes that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has received almost all of the votes that went to the Virtue Party (FP) in 1999 and about half of the votes that went to the Nationalist Action, Motherland and True Path parties (MHP, ANAP and DYP). These are quite consistent with the figures given in Table 1 , related to the parties mentioned. However, our data indicates that in addition, two-fifths of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and almost one-fifth of the Republican People's Party (CHP) votes were also captured by the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The shift of votes from these two parties may have occurred during the post-election realignment process discussed above or may have re-shifted during that period. With regard to the remaining variables, Akarca also finds that the supporters of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) are predominantly less-educated. that the former captured substantial amounts of votes from the latter four parties. However, he gives no breakdown of these votes.
Regression results
Although the findings presented in the previous section paint a pretty good picture of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP's) success in attracting voters from most segments of the political spectrum, one needs to establish the statistical significance of these patterns and measure the influence of the variables under consideration on the likelihood of a voter casting his/her ballot for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in a framework where all other factors are controlled for. Besides determining the political parties from which the Justice and Development Party (AKP) supporters have originated, one could also investigate what types of voters were attracted from each party in particular. Our aim in this section is to accomplish these two tasks.
Our methodology involves explaining the tendency of a voter to vote for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 using his/her party choice in the 1999 election, his/her socio-demographic characteristics, ideological and religious leanings, and confidence in the future of the economy. To accomplish this, we fitted logit regressions to the survey data described in the previous section. To determine which segments of other parties Justice and Development Party (AKP) has attracted, we have also considered, as explanatory variables, the interactions between the political party choices in 1999 and the remaining variables. We should note that this methodology is applicable to any data set, provided that it contains, besides voter characteristics, party choice information for two consecutive elections. Thus, its application to similar situations in other countries can shed light on those as well. In fitting our equations, we have employed an estimation option available in the software package STATA to compute robust standard errors, treating the data as a collection of clusters. Observations within the clusters -which, in our case are the provinces -are allowed to be dependent while observations from different clusters are assumed to be independent. For more detail on this procedure, the reader is referred to Rogers (1993) .
In order to gauge the relative explanatory powers of the variables representing 1999 party choices of voters and their various characteristics, we estimated two preliminary regressions which are presented in the first two columns of Table 4. In the first regression, the tendency of a voter to cast his/her ballot for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 is explained only by his/her party choice in the 1999 election. According to coefficient estimates, a support for the Republican People's Party (CHP) in 1999 appears to reduce the likelihood of voting for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, but a choice of one of the other parties in 1999 increases it. A vote for the Virtue Party (FP) in 1999 increases the likelihood most, followed by a vote for the True Path Party (DYP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), the Nationalistic Action Party (MHP) and the Democratic Left Party (DSP), in that order. The second regression links the probability of a voter voting for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 to his/her gender, age, years of schooling, place on the ideological spectrum, degree of religiosity, and optimism about the future of the economy. All of these factors, except gender, appear to provide significant information about the voter's embrace or rejection of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Being older, further to the right, more religious, and more confident in the future of the economy, raises the chances of support for the party. On the other hand, an increase in the years of schooling reduces it. With pseudo R-square values of 0.13 and 0.16, respectively, both equations seem to have a reasonable degree of explanatory power. The logical next step is to consider a specification which combines the two sets of variables.
In the third regression given in Table 4 Although the last specification estimated permits both sets of variables to have independent influences on the decision to vote for the Justice and Development Party (AKP), it is restrictive in the sense that it does not allow the impact of the Gender, Age, Schooling, Religiosity, Ideology and Economy variables to vary by the party voted for in 1999. However, given the sheer size of the vote movements and also that those parties have quite different constituencies, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is likely to have attracted different types of voters from each party. Therefore, in the final step of our empirical work, we estimate a more comprehensive model which allows us to look into this possibility. To be more specific, we estimate a model which includes the party dummies and their interactions with the remaining variables. In fact, this model could be considered as an 'unrestricted' version of the earlier specification where each sociodemographic variable is replaced by seven interaction terms. Along with the six parties, the rest of the sample treated as a separate affiliation which, in turn, implies that instead of a single slope parameter, seven different slopes are estimated.
The estimates from the unrestricted model reported in Table 5 reveal that almost all of the Turkish voters had the economy on their minds when they entered the voting booth in 2002. Its promise of a strong economy provided a near universal appeal for the Justice and Development Party (AKP). All of the interaction terms involving the Economy variable are positive and significant, except the one for the Democratic Left Party (DSP). This across-the-board confidence in the ability of the Justice and Development party (AKP) to reverse the misfortune of the economy probably had a lot to do with the successes of the municipal administrations under the mayors who joined the party after its formation. These were especially effective in providing services to the slum-dwellers living at the outskirts of the cities. In fact, the leader of the party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, developed his reputation after becoming the mayor of Istanbul in 1994. Furthermore, after having tried and lost faith in most of the parties, the Turkish electorate did not have too many choices left besides the newly formed Justice and Development Party (AKP). Consequently, the party became the main beneficiary of "economic voting". Finally, the growing hope and anticipation in the build-up to the election that a single party government can be formed by the party, and its formation after the election, must also have led a substantial number of voters to coalesce around the party, following the dismal economic performances of various coalition governments over the past decade.
Moving on to the Ideology variable, the party appears also to have attracted especially the right-leaning voters of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Republican People's Party (CHP). The less educated voters of the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Virtue Party (FP), older voters of the Nationalistic Action Party (MHP), and the female voters of the True Path Party (DYP), the Virtue Party (FP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) exhibit a greater tendency to switch to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Interestingly, religiosity was not a distinguishing feature of those who switched to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from any of the other parties. However, the presence of the Ideology and the Schooling variables acting as a proxy for religiosity may be partially responsible for this.
Expressed in another way, our findings imply that the segment of the Motherland Party (ANAP) voters the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was able to capture was predominantly less-educated, further to the right ideologically, and confident about the future of the economy under the latter party's rule. Those who switched from the Democratic Left Party (DSP) can be characterized as being more right-leaning, those from the True Path Party (DYP) as being disproportionately female and having an optimistic outlook on the future of the economy, and those from the Virtue Party (FP) as mainly being female, with less years of schooling, and high level of optimism concerning the future performance of the economy. The females, the older, and the more optimistic individuals about the future of the economy dominate those who shifted from the Nationalistic Action Party (MHP). The right-leaning and the optimistic about the future of the economy are predominant among those who made the switch from the Republican People's Party and the remaining parties. Given that there are no appropriate studies with which we can compare these findings, we believe that they provide our unique contribution to the understanding of the 2002 election outcome.
Conclusions
This paper was motivated mainly by the fact that more than half of the votes moved from one party to another between the 1999 and 2002 elections in Turkey. None of the parties which entered the parliament after the 1999 election were able to do so in 2002. The lion's share of the votes lost by these parties went to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The micro data analyzed here provides evidence that further vote switches occurred immediately after the election. It appears that in the less than eighteen months between its formation and the time our data was collected, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) captured almost all of the former Virtue Party (FP) votes, about half of the former Motherland Party (ANAP), True Path Party (DYP) and Nationalistic Action Party (MHP) votes, two-fifths of the former Democratic Left Party (DSP) votes, and about onefifth of the votes of the former Republican People's Party (CHP) and the remaining parties.
Our econometric findings suggest that a strong belief on the part of the electorate that a good economic performance can be achieved through a single-party government formed by the party was a leading factor in the success of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). It appears that at a time when voters were outraged by inter-party squabbling, corruption allegations and the poor economic performance under various coalitions formed by the other parties, its promise of an effective and stable single-party government and disavowal of political Islam, led voters from various parts of the political spectrum and various segments of the society to coalesce around the Justice and Development party (AKP). We also found that for the voters coming from the left-ofcenter Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Republican People's Party (CHP), and the right-of-center Motherland Party (ANAP), ideological factors played an important role, besides the economy, whereas in the case of voters transferred from the right-of-center True Path Party (DYP), pro-Islamist Virtue Party (FP) and ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), it was the demographic factors. It appears that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was more appealing to the less-ideological center-right swing voters, some of whom had switched to the center-left parties in the previous election, than to the hard core right-wing voters who remained loyal to their parties. The more pragmatic and less ideological discourse of party leader Erdoğan, no doubt played an important role in this Following a spectacular election victory in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) managed to raise its vote share further after ruling one legislative term. A commonly-shared view is that this had much to do with favorable global economic conditions and the government's seemingly-sincere efforts in making progress on Turkey's accession to the European Union. It would be interesting and useful to find out to what extent the party's success was the result of further political realignment in response to the party's liberal policies and to what extent it was a consequence of good economic performance. An empirical analysis of more recent data, similar to the one performed here could provide us with valuable insights in this regard. Table 4 notes: a/ For definitions of variables see Table 2 notes. The dependent variable in each regression is AKP02. The numbers in parantheses are the probability values of two-sided tests of significance. Shaded cells indicate significance at the 10% level. The number of observations used in the estimation of the regressions is 1080. 
